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1.  Introduction 
The debate on direct democracy has triggered several studies that  have essentially 
discussed the competence of the voters, the role the special interest groups that can fund 
election campaigns may have to subvert public policy process, the how direct democracy 
affects policy, the how direct democracy influences economic performance.  An explicit 
theory of the circumstances that make direct democracy more or less likely to occur does not 
exist. Beginning from Tocqueville (1835) some influences on the extent of democracy have 
been proposed in the political science literature; some others  stem as implication of the 
theoretical models on the studies on the democratic institutions. This paper departs from these 
hypotheses by presenting and empirically evaluating a number of economic, demographic, 
political and cultural  determinants of direct democracy. Specifically, we investigate on the 
impact of these elements on a unique dataset of country index on citizen law making in 87 
countries. This index refers both to the availability of direct democracy instruments and their 
actual  use. Furthermore, we also consider the number of referendums that took place in the 
last four years. In this way we provide both a qualitative and a quantitative assessment of 
direct democracy. 
Although we do not dwell on legal and institutional details, it is helpful to define a few 
terms and provide a little institutional context before proceeding. Direct democracy is a broad 
term that encompasses a variety of decision processes, including town meetings, recall 
elections, initiatives, and various forms of referendums. This paper focuses on the two most 
important and widely used processes, initiatives and referendums. The right of initiative is the 
right of citizens to put an issue onto the political agenda of a polity. The referendum is a 
ballot vote on a law already approved by the legislature, also qualified for the ballot by 
collecting a predetermined number of signatures. In both cases citizens are involved, by 
registering or signing an initiative and by taking part in the final decision-making in a 
referendum.
1   
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows:  In  Section 2  we posit  the theoretical 
hypotheses to explain the adoption of direct democracy. In section 3 we present the 
                                                 
1 There is some inconsistency in terminology from both substantive and formal point of view. Referendum is 
sometimes used as a broad term for all ballot propositions and sometimes for the particular process of 
challenging a government law by petition. Furthermore, we use referendums instead of referenda according to 
the recent literature.    2 
methodology to construct the  Direct Democracy  Index which is the indicator we use to 
measure direct democracy. Section 4 describes the data and specifies the variables used for 




2. Towards a theory of the determinants of direct democracy 
Empirical  literature on the impact of economic, political and cultural factors on the 
extent of direct democracy is not developed, probably due to the lack of a formalized theory 
that explicitly refers to this issue.
2 Starting from Tocqueville (1835), political theorists have 
debated on the  requisites  for a successfully functioning  of democratic institutions.  More 
recently, Aghion et al. (2004) consider a problem of constitutional design in which a society 
has to choose the degree of insulation of its political leader. The political leader has to 
implement a reform, but voters do not know ex ante whether the executive will reform or just 
expropriate rents from the voters. This degree of insulation is captured by a (super) majority 
of individuals (M) that can block the action of the leader (expropriation or reform) once the 
aggregate shock on preferences is realized. If M is high, only a large majority of voters can 
block the reform. In contrast, a low M means that when in office the leader is kept checked by 
small fractions of the electorate. The model shows that: 1) in the absence of expropriation, or 
with no bad leaders, simple majority voting is chosen because  with risk neutrality the 
representative voter ex ante does not want to prevent an ex post majority to stop a policy; 2) 
insulation is decreasing in the probability (1 - p) of expropriation and in the loss b from it. 
Thus, low protection of property rights (i.e. higher scope for expropriation) would require 
lower insulation; 3) insulation is increasing in the average benefit of the reform. With more 
expected benefit from the reform, the voter behind a veil of ignorance is willing to accept a 
higher risk of expropriation in order to increase the probability that the reform passes.  
                                                 
2 The empirical analyses on direct democracy has mainly discussed on the relationship between initiatives and 
referendums and government spending  (Matsusaka 1995; 2004; Feld and Matsusaka, 2003), and on the impact 
of direct democracy institutions on economic performance (Feld and Savioz, 1997; Blomberg et al., 2004; Frey 
et al., 2001). Most of these studies deal either with Switzerland or the US states. Barro (1999) represents the first 
study that assesses the  determinants of  democracy on a cross country basis.  Barro analyzes a panel of 100 
countries from 1960 to 1995 and tests the relationship between economic development and the country’s 
propensity to experience democracy.   3 
Aghion et al. (2004) use this framework to empirically discuss the determinants of the 
degree of insulation. To this end, they consider two sets of explanatory variables, institutions 
and racial fragmentation (political polarization, ethnic fractionalization, electoral laws and so 
on). The proxies for insulation vary from a simple dichotomy democracy vs. autocracy, to 
democratic forms of government. A dictator is the most insulated leader of all, as well as 
Presidential systems  is the  “most i nsulated” form of government, Semi-Presidential (or 
Hybrid) the middle level and Parliamentary systems the least insulated. Overall, the authors 
find significant evidence that various indices of insulations are positively correlated with 
measure of fractionalization and polarization. Thus,  more polarized societies tend to have 
more “insulated” rulers. The dominant group knows that it cannot dominate the other groups 
unless  its leader is sufficiently  insulated.  Also, forms of governments appear to be 
endogenous to ethnic fractionalization.   
We use this theoretical framework to analyze direct democracy institutions, as such 
institutions represent  a form of non-insulation.  To  our purpose  we  posit a number of 
hypotheses on the determinants of direct democracy that we aim to test in the next sections. 
Such hypotheses fall into three broad categories: economic, institutional and cultural ones.  
Economic  and demographic  variables. E conomic theory has  investigated  the 
relationship running from democracy to growth predicting opposing effects.
3 On  the  one 
hand, democratic institutions g uarantee checks and balances, limiting  the p ossibility  that 
politicians extract rents from public budget at expense of voters’ welfare. On the other hand, 
an expansion of democracy promotes rich to poor redistribution of income and may increase 
the power of interest groups. Evidence that democratizations yield subsequent economic 
growth is quite weak. Recently, Persson and Tabellini (2006) support that democracy is too 
blunt a concept and a significant relationship with economic growth depends on the details of 
democratic regimes such as electoral rules, forms of government, stability and persistence of 
democratic institutions.  
In this paper we are interested in the reverse channel of such link; we focus on  the 
impact of  economic variables on  direct democracy institutions.  The hypothesis is  loosely 
based on  Lipset  (1959), which  discusses  a broad category of economic development as 
determinant of democracy, including indices of wealth  (per capita income), of urbanization 
                                                 
3 For a complete survey of economic theories on the link between democracy and growth, see Przeworski and 
Limongi (1993) and Przeworski et al. (2000). 
   4 
and of industrialization. The key element of this hypothesis is that richer countries are more 
willing to promote democratic values and receptivity to democratic political tolerance norms. 
Starting from an early literature (Mauro, 1995, La Porta et al., 1999) recently Alesina et al. 
(2003) point on ethnic heterogeneity as determinant of economic success both in terms of 
output (GDP growth) and the quality of institutions (measured by the extent of corruption, 
political freedom, etc.). The results show that the democracy index they use negatively 
impacts racial fractionalization.  
Institutional variables. Political economics models (Tabellini and Persson, 2003) have 
investigated on the institutions of democratic regimes.  This approach sheds light on how 
alternative institutional arrangements affect the binding force of checks and balances and, 
therefore, the accountability of the political the  system. A  central feature of this line  of 
research  is that i n presidential regimes effective decision-making power  is split among 
different politicians, who are separately and directly accountable to voters.  Presidential 
systems are therefore predicted to have less rent extraction than parliamentary regimes. 
Majoritarian systems also have more direct accountability because voters  seek consensus 
among individuals (under plurality rule) rather than among parties  (broader coalitions of 
voters), which should restrict rent extraction. Furthermore,  majoritarian elections are more 
effective in deterring political rents since the outcome of an election is generally more 
sensitive to the incumbent’s performance. Following this line of reasoning, we argue that as 
presidential and majoritarian  systems are m ore accountable to voters,  under these systems 
blocking the implementation of  legislation takes places indirectly, within the institutional 
structure of delegation of power. In other words, in presidential system and under majoritarian 
electoral rules  voters are less interested in  using  direct democracy instruments. These 
instruments therefore work as corrective  devices, which substitute  other institutional 
arrangements in securing checks and balances between the bodies of government.  
Cultural variables. The relationship between democracy and cultural factors has been 
in the political science since Lipset (1959). Lipset refers to education, predicting that a better 
educated population  entails  better chances for democracy and democratic practices.  This 
positive relationship may be because education may teach individuals towards having a higher 
value of staying politically involved. Subsequent analyses have discussed the role of cultural 
conditions on democracy (Huntington, 1991; Putnam, 1993; Landes, 1998). T hese studies 
typically use the religious affiliation as a proxy for the “dimension” of the culture (i.e. ethic, 
tolerance, trust), yet they do not investigate on democracy as an univocal concept, they rather   5 
refer to democracy as a government performance. Putnam (1993) analyzes the effect of public 
good provision, while Landes (1998) is concerned with the flow of people, goods and ideas 
between countries. Furthermore, many cultural explanations of democratic institutions and 
policies have a political element to them, as Landes’s emphasis on the use of intolerance for 
political ends makes clear. Huntington (1991) explains that Catholic Church in 1960s became 
a powerful force toward democratization, probably to maintain its membership.  Recently, 
Matsusaka (2005)  and Glaeser  et al. (2006) turn to the link between education and 
democracy. Matsusaka in reviewing the existing theory on the changes that direct democracy 
may have on public policy, affirms that the rising education among the population and the 
falling of the information costs due to the communication technology revolution have 
dramatically reduced the knowledge advantage that elected officials had over ordinary 
citizens. The result of these trends is that important policy decisions are shifting from 
legislatures to the people by eclipsing legislatures in setting policy agenda. Matsusaka bases 
such assertion by simply reporting data on the growing amount of higher education in the 
American population; yet he does not provide any statistical test for this claim, as he focuses 
on the review of the literature about the initiative and the referendum to highlight some key 
issues for the future.  Glaeser  et al. (2006) discuss the link running from education to 
democracy arguing that  schooling teaches people to i nteract with others and raises the 
benefits of civic participation.  Democracy has a wide potential base of support but offers 
weak incentives to its defenders, whereas  dictatorship provides stronger incentives to a 
narrower base. As education raises the benefits of civic participation, it raises the support for 
more democratic regimes relative to dictatorships.  
 
3. An index of direct democracy  
To measure direct democracy we use the Direct Democracy Index (DDI) obtained by 
three  sources:  Kaufmann (2004) for 43 European countries, Hwang (2005) for  33 A sian 
countries, and Madroñal (2005) for 17 Latin American countries. Due to data availability, our 
dataset is restricted to 87 countries. This index is a unique measure of the quality of direct 
democracy and its performance by applying the procedures the country’s political system 
provides in order to proposing, approving, amending, and deleting laws through popular 
initiative and referendums.
4   
                                                 
4 For example, Matsusaka and McCarty (2001) find that the amount of time allowed to collect signatures does 
not seem to matter for the impact of direct democracy, while the number of signatures does matter. In the index   6 
Kaufmann (2004) gives  a country-rating into seven categories is provided for 43 
European countries. Each country is classified as: 1) radical democrat; 2) progressive; 3) 
cautious; 4) hesitant; 5) fearful; 6) beginner and, finally, 7) authoritarian. Hwang (2005) and 
Madroñal (2005), instead, use a four-category rank, and after careful reading of each country 
report, we have re-ranked these countries in the 7 previous categories.  The only country 
ranked 7 is Switzerland, and then there are 10 countries ranked 6. 13 countries are ranked 5, 
while 11 are classed 4, 9 are ranked 3, 18 are classed 2, and the largest group (25) are ranked 
1.  In the estimation we have converted this ranking so that they lie between 0 and 1 scale, as 
it is common in this literature, to use OLS estimation techniques. Furthermore, as a robustness 
check we have used an ordered probit for the original ranking. For the ease of exposition, in 
Table 1 we have assigned a number in the 1 to 7 scale for each category, with 7 being the 
country rated as radical democrat, and 1  the  countries with the lowest level of direct 
democracy. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
  We need to point out a few limitations of this index. First, it does not tell anything 
about which kind of topics are called for referendums and initiatives. For example, we cannot 
distinguish whether a country is more inclined to have referendums on economic or civil 
issues, for example. Second, the index mixes together the legal possibility of having 
referendums and initiatives and the actual choice of exercising them. Since these two 
circumstances belong to different characteristics of each country (the constitution and the law, 
on the one hand, and parties or movements in the political arena, on the other hand), and we 
cannot discriminate between them. Third,  it i s a subjective index, therefore the way it i s 
constructed lacks transparency. For this reason we complement this qualitative analysis with a 
                                                                                                                                                         
these features are given equal weight. However, subjectivity may have some positive features, since it takes into 
account both the actual referendums and initiatives and the quality of the process. The index is a subjective 
measure of direct democracy that takes into account both the actual referendums and initiatives and the quality of 
the process. Consider the case of Belarus. In this country 9 referendums have been held from 1995 to 2004, but 
the country has the lowest possible score. Referendums were proposed and used by President Lukashenko to 
increase its power at the expenses of the legislature, and a positive vote has been allegedly obtained by the 
means of arrests of political adversaries and pressures on the population.   7 
quantitative one, by regressing the number of referendums that took place from 2000 to 2005 
on the same regressors. 
 
 
4.  Model and data 
Using the index presented in the previous section, we now investigate the correlates   
of direct democracy. We estimate a number of models and specifications. Our first approach 
is to regress a model that  considers  demographic, economic, institutional and cultural 
variables. The model is the following: 
 
i i i i i DDI e a a a a + + + + = CULT INST ECDEM 3 2 1 0         (1) 
 
where DDI is the variable defined in the previous Section, ECDEM is a vector of economic 
and demographic variables, INST is a vector of institutional variables, CULT is a vector of 
religious and cultural variables, and e is an error term. ECDEM includes the log of GDP per 
capita in the year 2000, the log of population and the urbanization rate and a measure of 
ethnic fractionalisation.  INST consists of two dummy variables  for majoritarian and 
presidential systems. CULT includes the percentages of population that are Catholic and 
Muslim; and the log of school attainment. We always include dummies for Latin American 
and Asian countries.  Because income and direct democracy may be affected by reverse 
causation, we use latitude as instrument.
5 
We also estimate a second model, focusing on some indicators of quality of 
government broadly discussed in the literature (La Porta et al., 1999). The model takes the 
following specification: 
  
i i i i VAR DDI e b b b + + + = 2 1 0 Z               (2) 
 
where  Z is a vector of variables that were significant in the first model, and VAR is the 
variable of interest that we add once at time. These variables include control of corruption 
(measuring the exercise of public power for private gain, including both petty and grand 
                                                 
5 Acemoglu et al. (2005) address the same issue concerning democracy in a panel setting, by using past savings 
rates and changes in the incomes of trading partners.   8 
corruption and state capture), political civil and human rights, political stability (measuring the 
likelihood of violent threats to, or changes in, government, including terrorism), rule of law (the 
extent to which property rights are protected by the police and courts), and  government 
effectiveness (measuring the competence of the bureaucracy and the quality of public service 
delivery). 
Some of these variables may be endogenous to direct democracy. For example, higher 
corruption may negatively affect the likelihood of a country to use initiatives and referendums 
because the civil society is not endowed with instruments such free press that make it possible 
an open discussion on political and economic issues. At the same time, in a country with a 
low DDI politicians will tend to keep issues apart from the people and under-invest in social 
capital to avoid being more closely scrutinised by voters reducing the room for corruption. To 
deal with the reverse causality between this set of variables and direct democracy, we use the 
legal origin of each country: British (common law), French, German, Scandinavian (all part of 
the civil law tradition), and Socialist, as instruments. In a number of papers Shleifer with his 
co-authors has argued  that legal origins have an impact on institutions and therefore on 
outcomes (Glaeser and Shleifer, 2002 provide a theoretical interpretation of these 
differences).  Legal origins affect judicial independence and this has an effect on the 
protection of property rights (La Porta et al., 2004); legal origins influence the regulation of 
entry and this affect corruption (Djankov et al., 2002); the quality of government and political 
rights impinge on the legal origins (La Porta et al., 1999).  
Figure 1 shows the average value of the Direct Democracy Index according to the 
legal origin. The British, French and socialist origin have basically the same average, the 
Scandinavian and German ones have higher values, but represent a minority of our sample 
(10 countries). The main traditions of common, civil and socialist law do not show strong 
differences in direct democracy: if any, the two furthest (common law and socialist) in their 
nature are the closest in terms of direct democracy.   
 
[Fig. 1 about here] 
 
It i s typical in the empirical literature to use ordinary least squares methods, and its 
variations, although data are categories, although in the normalised (0, 1) space. In both 
models we correct estimates for heteroscedasticity, to take care of fact that the democracy   9 
index takes discrete values. We also address this issue by also re-estimating equation (1) with 
ordered probit.  
The variable  DDI comes from Kaufmann (2004),  Hwang (2005) Madroñal (2005), 
fractionalization is taken from Alesina et al. (2003); Persson and Tabellini (2003) is the 
source of institutional variables; control of corruption, political rights, political  stability, rule 
of law, and government effectiveness are from Kaufmann et al. (2005) for the year 2000, the 
remaining variables are taken from La Porta et al. (1999). Table 2 gives summary statistics 
for the variables involved in our analysis.  
  
[Table 2 about here] 
 
 
5.  Results 
Table 3 reports the results of equation (1). As income may himself be the result, not 
the cause, of direct democracy, we use the absolute value of the latitude as instrument. We 
start with economic and demographic variables:  the first column of  Table 3 shows that 
income per capita is positive and significant, meaning that direct democracy is an ordinary 
good that is consumed more in richer societies. The idea of Aghion et al. (2004) that in more 
fragmented societies a group imposes restrictions on political liberty to impose control on the 
other groups is not verified. Ethnic fractionalization is negative as the theory predicts, but is 
not significant. Both geographical dummies are significantly negative. Adding institutional 
and religious variables (column 2) strongly improve the goodness of fit of the model. While 
majoritarian voting rule and presidential system  appear do  not cause direct democracy 
institutions, the share of Catholics is significantly positive, but the size of the coefficient is 
very small. In the regression shown in column (3) we add the log of school attainment; the 
impact of the education variable reduces the significance of income, but does not change the 
main results of the model. Furthermore, the variable is always significant, providing evidence 
for the link between education and democracy highlighted by Glaeser et al. (2006). The log of 
infant mortality and the urbanization rate (in columns 4, 5 and 6) are not significant. Overall, 
the goodness of fit is satisfactory and the joint significance of the variables is quite high. 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
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  To  estimate equation (2), we include the variables that have been consistently 
significant in Table 3: log of income per capita, share of Catholics, log of school attainment, 
plus the two geographical dummies. In all regressions we use the absolute latitude and the 
British, the French, the Scandinavian and the socialist legal origins as a set of  instruments 
respectively  for  the income and  for the governance variables. We omit the German legal 
origin. In each of the five estimations presented in Table 4 we include one of the governance 
variables at a time: control of corruption, government effectiveness, political rights, political 
stability and rule of law. We find that the only two significant variables are those concerned 
with the political infrastructure of a country: political rights  and political  stability. The 
positive coefficients of these variables suggest that the higher the quality of the democratic 
process, the higher the likelihood of using direct democracy as one of the available tools; 
moreover, a more stable democracy enables voters to decide directly more than a democracy 
in which there are frequent changes and struggles among different groups. The goodness of fit 
is satisfactory, and the joint significance of the variables is quite high. 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
  A robustness check i s provided in  Table 5, where we e stimate  equation (1) with 
ordered probit, therefore taking into explicit account the ordinal nature of the data on direct 
democracy. The most notable difference with respect to Table 3 is the significance of ethnic 
fractionalization that  has a  negative coefficient, a s the theory of endogenous institutions 
suggests.  Infant mortality and urbanization are also  significant. All other variables have 
basically the  same behaviour of the 2SLS estimates. Again, the joint significance of the 
variables is very high, but the pseudo-R
2 is lower. 
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
As highlighted in the previous section, an important caveat of the result we have 
presented is that they are based on a qualitative index of direct democracy. Table 6 turns to 
the results of the count data estimates  employing as dependent variable the number of 
referendums that took place from 2000 to 2005, instead of the Direct Democracy Index. The 
source of these data is the Research Centre on Direct Democracy (2006). The findings do not 
differ much from previous estimates. The log of income per capita and the share of Catholics   11 
are positive and significant, although less than in previous estimates. In contrast, the log of 
population becomes significantly positive. Log of school attainment, infant mortality and the 
urbanization rate are all significant. Some problems arise with the geographical dummies. The 
Latin America dummy is negative but often insignificant, whereas Asia is negative and 
sometimes significant, though not at a very high level. Although these results are consistent to 
previous ones, we take them carefully  since we cannot control for endogeneity, and the 
number of referendums is a too simplistic measure that does not take into account the quality 
of the democratic process (plebiscites are a form of direct democracy, but are ineffective at 
scrutinising the executive power).  
 
[Table 6 about here] 
 
 
6.  Conclusions 
In this paper we have addressed the issue of the determinants of direct democracy. In 
doing so, we have exploited a newly assembled dataset that encompasses 87 countries. We 
have estimated a number of  models, with an emphasis on controlling for possible reverse 
causality effect with direct democracy. We find that income per capita, education, and the 
share of Catholics  are positively  related to direct democracy.  Institutional variables as 
presidential system and majoritarian voting rules have no effect. Non consistent results across 
estimation techniques are obtained for population, urbanization and ethnic fractionalization.  
Latin America tends to be systematically related to less direct democracy.  
When we move to  governance  variables, we find that political rights and political 
stability are significantly positive determinants of direct democracy, indicating that direct 
democracy comes after some political preconditions are fulfilled. 
In terms of the theory of endogenous institutions described in Section 2, we find very 
poor evidence in favour of the model of political insulation provided by Aghion et al. (2004). 
In contrast, the theoretical link between education and democracy seems confirmed, as well as 
the idea that democracy i s an ordinary good, that i s consumed more a s long a s income 
increases. 
Further work should address the issue of time, therefore exploring changes of direct 
democracy in a panel data  setting, both with qualitative and quantitative indicators.   12 
Furthermore a distinction between social and economic issues on the one hand and individual 
rights issues on the other hand needs also to be investigated.    13 
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Table 1 – The Direct Democracy Index  
Country  Score    Country  Score 
Afghanistan  1    Luxembourg  5 
Albania  2    Kyrgyz Republic  2 
Argentina  2    Lao, People's Dem.  1 
Armenia  1    Latria  5 
Australia  6    Macedonia  2 
Austria  5    Malaysia  1 
Azerbaijan  1    Maldives  2 
Bangladesh  2    Malta  4 
Belarus  1    Mexico  1 
Belgium  5    Moldova  2 
Bhutan  1    Mongolia  1 
Bolivia  1    Nepal  1 
Brazil  2    Netherlands  6 
Brunei  1    New Zealand  6 
Bulgaria  5    Nicaragua  1 
Cambodia  1    Norway  5 
Chile  2    Pakistan  1 
China  1    Panama  2 
Colombia  3    Paraguay  3 
Costa Rica  1    Peru  3 
Croatia  3    Philippines  6 
Cyprus  3    Poland  5 
Czech Republic  5    Portugal  5 
Denmark  6    Romania  4 
Ecuador  3    Russian Federation  1 
El Salvador  2    Singapore  1 
Estonia  4    Slovak Republic  6 
Finland  4    Slovenia  6 
France  5    Spain  5 
Georgia  2    Sri Lanka  1 
Germany  4    Sweden  5 
Greece  3    Switzerland  7 
Guatemala  2    Taiwan  4 
Honduras  1    Tajikistan  2 
Hungary  4    Thailand  1 
Iceland  3    Turkey  2 
India  4    Turkmenistan  2 
Indonesia  1    Ucraine  1 
Ireland  6    United Kingdom  4 
Italy  6    Uruguay  5 
Japan  4    Uzbekistan  2 
Kazakstan  2    Venezuela  3 
Korea, Rep.  4    Vietnam  1 
Lithuania  6       
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Table 2 – Summary statistics 
Variable  Mean  Variance  Min  Max 
Asia  0.351     0.480                     0.000  1.000 
Control of corruption  0.199     1.128     -1.364  2.451 
DD index (0,1)  0.428     0.261    0.143          1.000 
Ethnic fractionalization  0.339     0.216        0.002       0.796 
Government effectiveness   0.281    1.059   -1.681   2.252 
Latin America  0.176     0.382                     0.000  1.000 
Log income per capita  7.650     1.318   4.997    10.151 
Log infant mortality  3.357     0.844    1.979    5.188 
Log population  1.059     0.764      -1.397  3.117 
Log school attainment  1.623    0.487    0.177   2.435 
Majoritarian  0.536     0.501           0.000           1.000 
Number of referendums  1.244     2.670                    0.000  15.000 
Political rights  0.225      1.032   -2.322   1.719 
Political stability  0.255    0.982  -2.246   1.693 
Presidential  0.494     0.502                     0.000  1.000 
Rule of law  0.203    1.059   -1.618   2.054 
Share of Catholics   36.240      41.214     0.000  97.300 
Share of Muslims  14.657     29.430           0.000         99.900 
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        Table 3 – 2SLS results 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 




-0.325*   
(0.202) 
-0.796*   
(0.372) 
-0.220*   
(0.100) 
-0.288**   
(0.137) 




0.067*   
(0.035) 




0.095*   
(0.039) 




0.040   
(0.046) 











-0.198   
(0.151) 
-0.128   
(0.093) 
-0.150   
(0.113) 




-0.051   
(0.055) 
-0.063   
(0.039) 
 
Presidential    -0.072 
(0.057) 
-0.027   
(0.076) 





Share of Catholics     0.0033***   
(0.0006) 
0.0026***   
(0.0007) 












-0.0006   
(0.0005) 
 
Log school attainment 
 
    0.129*   
(0.066) 
0.155*   
(0.079) 
  0.179*   
(0.096) 
0.194**   
(0.090) 
Log infant mortality  
 
      0.075   
(0.120) 





        0.0001 
(0.0017) 
-0.0019   
(0.0021) 




0.121   
(0.074) 




0.078    
(0.061) 




-0.211*   
(0.111) 
-0.230*   
(0.124) 




Obs.  87  79  53  53  50  54 
R
2  0.443  0.608  0.678  0.682  0.652  0.665 
F  14.54***  14.60***  14.95***  13.14***  23.44***  21.75*** 
        Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Log of income  
        per capita is instrumented with the absolute value of the latitude. 
 
 Table 4 – Governance indicators and direct democracy 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Control of corruption  0.019   
(0.043) 
       
Government effectiveness    -0.148  
(0.124) 
     
Political rights      0.300***   
(0.102) 
   
Political stability        0.073*   
(0.036) 
 
Rule of law          0.106   
(0.171) 
Obs.  53  53  53  53  53 
R
2  0.642  0.679  0.734  0.661  0.665 
F  22.96***  20.87***   24.74***   22.63***  20.19*** 
Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. Covariates include log of income per capita, the share of Catholics, log of school attainment, 
and the two geographical dummies.  Log of income per capita is instrumented with the absolute value of the 
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Table 5 – Ordered probit results 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 








1.226**   
(0.464) 
Log population   0.095 
(0.182) 
0.011   
(0.214) 
0.525   
(0.284) 
0.248   
(0.311) 
 
Ethnic fractionalization  -1.121**   
(0.541) 
-0.805    
(0.636) 
-1.717*   
(0.739) 
-1.561*   
(0.921) 




  -0.347   
(0.269) 
-0.007   
(0.354) 





  -0.382   
(0.340) 
-0.455   
(0.428) 
-0.140   
(0.503) 
 
Share of Catholics 
 
  0.018***   
(0.004) 
0.020***   
(0.006) 
0.019***   
(0.006) 
0.021***   
(0.005) 
Share of Muslims 
 
  -0.0005  
(0.0044) 
0.0015   
(0.0112) 
-0.0024   
(0.0122) 
 
Log school attainment 
 
    1.240*   
(0.682) 
1.476**   
(0.755) 
2.358**   
(0.739) 
Log infant mortality  
 
      0.637   
(0.755) 




        -0.024*   
(0.013) 
Asia  -0.684*   
(0.355) 
0.318   
(0.407) 
0.909   
(0.577) 
0.971   
(0.612) 
0.830   
(0.540) 
Latin America  -0.484   
(0.311) 
-1.355***   
(0.526) 
-1.345**   
(0.586) 




Obs.  87  79  53  51  50 
Pseudo-R
2  0.165  0.245  0.283  0.284  0.303 
Wald  57.83***  104.41***  52.27***  51.38***  57.42*** 






















   21 
             Table 6 – Count data results 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Constant 
 
-2.880**   
(1.353) 




Log income per capita 
 
0.085**   
(0.038) 
0.309**   
(0.169) 




0.061    
(0.152) 
0.819**   
(0.309) 




0.046    
(0.538) 





0.129    
(0.244) 





0.261    
(0.274) 
-0.371    
(0.525) 
 
Share of Catholics  
 
0.016***   
(0.004) 








-0.044    
(0.053) 
0.014    
(0.021) 
Log school attainment 
 
  1.158**   
(0.578) 
0.773**   
(0.390) 
Log infant mortality  
 
    -2.512*   
(1.435)   
Urbanization rate 
 




-1.044***   
(0.387) 
-1.624    
(1.825) 




-0.864**    
(0.325) 
-0.485    
(0.395) 
-0.590   
(0.515) 
Obs.  79  53  50 
Wald  52.59***  67.66***  34.91*** 
Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. *, **, and *** denote significance 
at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 